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The Surprise Examination or Unexpected Hanging Paradox
Timothy Y. Chow
[As published in Amer. Math. Monthly 105 (1998), 41–51; ArXived with permission.]
Many mathematicians have a dismissive attitude towards paradoxes. This is un-
fortunate, because many paradoxes are rich in content, having connections with serious
mathematical ideas as well as having pedagogical value in teaching elementary logical
reasoning. An excellent example is the so-called “surprise examination paradox” (de-
scribed below), which is an argument that seems at first to be too silly to deserve much
attention. However, it has inspired an amazing variety of philosophical and mathemati-
cal investigations that have in turn uncovered links to Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems,
game theory, and several other logical paradoxes (e.g., the liar paradox and the sorites
paradox). Unfortunately, most mathematicians are unaware of this because most of the
literature has been published in philosophy journals.
In this article, I describe some of this work, emphasizing the ideas that are particularly
interesting mathematically. I also try to dispel some of the confusion that surrounds the
paradox and plagues even the published literature. However, I do not try to correct every
error or explain every idea that has ever appeared in print. Readers who want more
comprehensive surveys should see [30, chapters 7 and 8], [20], and [16].
At times I assume some knowledge of mathematical logic (such as may be found in
Enderton [10]), but the reader who lacks this background may safely skim these sections.
1. The paradox and the meta-paradox
Let us begin by recalling the paradox. It has many variants, the earliest probably being
Lennart Ekbom’s surprise drill, and the best known to mathematicians (thanks to Quine
and Gardner) being an unexpected hanging. We shall give the surprise examination
version.
A teacher announces in class that an examination will be held on some day during the
following week, and moreover that the examination will be a surprise. The students
argue that a surprise exam cannot occur. For suppose the exam were on the last day
of the week. Then on the previous night, the students would be able to predict that the
exam would occur on the following day, and the exam would not be a surprise. So it
is impossible for a surprise exam to occur on the last day. But then a surprise exam
cannot occur on the penultimate day, either, for in that case the students, knowing that
the last day is an impossible day for a surprise exam, would be able to predict on the
night before the exam that the exam would occur on the following day. Similarly, the
students argue that a surprise exam cannot occur on any other day of the week either.
Confident in this conclusion, they are of course totally surprised when the exam occurs
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(on Wednesday, say). The announcement is vindicated after all. Where did the students’
reasoning go wrong?
The natural reaction to a paradox like this is to try to resolve it. Indeed, if you have
not seen this paradox before, I encourage you to try to resolve it now before reading on.
However, I do not want to discuss the resolution of the paradox right away. Instead, for
reasons that should become apparent, I discuss what I call the “meta-paradox” first.
The meta-paradox consists of two seemingly incompatible facts. The first is that
the surprise exam paradox seems easy to resolve. Those seeing it for the first time
typically have the instinctive reaction that the flaw in the students’ reasoning is obvious.
Furthermore, most readers who have tried to think it through have had little difficulty
resolving it to their own satisfaction.
The second (astonishing) fact is that to date nearly a hundred papers on the paradox
have been published, and still no consensus on its correct resolution has been reached.
The paradox has even been called a “significant problem” for philosophy [30, chapter 7,
section VII]. How can this be? Can such a ridiculous argument really be a major unsolved
mystery? If not, why does paper after paper begin by brusquely dismissing all previous
work and claiming that it alone presents the long-awaited simple solution that lays the
paradox to rest once and for all?
Some other paradoxes suffer from a similar meta-paradox, but the problem is es-
pecially acute in the case of the surprise examination paradox. For most other trivial-
sounding paradoxes there is broad consensus on the proper resolution, whereas for the
surprise exam paradox there is not even agreement on its proper formulation. Since one’s
view of the meta-paradox influences the way one views the paradox itself, I must try to
clear up the former before discussing the latter.
Inmy view, most of the confusion has been caused by authors who have plunged into
the process of “resolving” the paradox without first having a clear idea of what itmeans to
“resolve” a paradox. The goal is poorly understood, so controversy over whether the goal
has been attained is inevitable. Let me now suggest a way of thinking about the process
of “resolving a paradox” that I believe dispels the meta-paradox.
In general, there are two steps involved in resolving a paradox. First, one establishes
precisely what the paradoxical argument is. Any unclear terms are defined carefully and
all assumptions and logical steps are stated clearly and explicitly, possibly in a formal
language of some kind. Second, one finds the fault in the argument. Sometimes, simply
performing step one reveals the flaw, e.g., when the paradox hinges on confusing two
different meanings of the same word, so that pointing out the ambiguity suffices to dispel
the confusion. In other cases, however, somethingmore needs to be done; onemust locate
the bad assumptions, the bad reasoning, or (in desperate circumstances) the flaw in the
structure of logic itself.
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These two steps seem straightforward, but there are a few subtleties. For example, if,
in the second step, the flaw is causedbybad assumptions, itmaybehard to isolate a unique
culprit. Sometimes what we discover is a set of mutually incompatible assumptions such
that rejecting any one of them suffices to eliminate the contradiction. When this occurs,
however, notice thatwhile itmay be an interesting question to decidewhich assumption to
reject, such a decision is not usually needed to resolve the paradox. It is usually enough to
exhibit the incompatible assumptions and state that their joint inconsistency is the source
of the paradox.
The first step of resolving a paradox can also be subtle. As many investigators of
the surprise exam paradox have noted, formal versions of a paradox sometimes miss the
essence of the original informal version. Such amistranslation evades the paradox instead
of resolving it. Certainly, this is a real danger, and numerous authors have fallen into this
trap. However, there is a simple but important point here that is often overlooked: the
question ofwhether or not a particular formalization of a paradox “captures its essence” is
to some extent a matter of opinion. Given two formalizations of the paradox, one person
may think that the first captures the essence better but anothermay prefer the second. One
cannot say who is objectively right, since there is always some vagueness in the original
informal account. To be sure, one can sometimes argue that a particular formalization is
inadequate by proposing a variation of the paradox that seems to retain its essence but
for which the particular formalization fails. Even here, though, there is some room for
differences of opinion, because one can sometimes argue that the variant paradox does
not in fact retain the essence but is actually a different paradox that requires a different
solution.
Thus, sometimes there exist multiple formalizations of a paradox that all capture its
essence reasonably well. In such cases I believe it is misguided to speak of the resolution
of the paradox. This point has also been made by Kirkham [16].
With these ideas in mind we can easily explain the meta-paradox. A careful look
at the literature confirms our suspicion that the paradox is not hard to resolve, because
most authors have succeeded in finding resolutions. Most of the controversies have
been false controversies. For example, there has been much debate between what I
call the “epistemological school” (which formalizes the paradox using concepts such as
knowledge, belief and memory) and the “logical school” (which avoids such concepts)
over who has the “right” formalization. But both approaches are reasonable and neither
is guilty of evasion.
Also, within the epistemological school there has beenmuchdebate overwhich axiom
of a certain set of mutually inconsistent axioms about knowledge should be rejected. The
question is an interesting one from the point of view of philosophically analyzing the
concept of knowledge, but if we agree that identifying the “right” axiom to reject is not
essential to resolving the paradox then this debate need not trouble us.
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Having dealt with the meta-paradox, we now turn to the paradox itself and explore
several different approaches.
2. The logical school
We mathematicians have a firm belief that logic and mathematics are consistent. When
we are confronted with a paradox, therefore, our tendency is to assume, even before
analyzing the paradox, that either the paradox cannot be translated into a purely logical
or mathematical argument, or that if it can be so translated, the faulty step or assumption
will become immediately apparent. So a natural reaction to the surprise examination
paradox (at least for a mathematician) is to take the students’ argument and try to convert
it into a rigorous proof in order to find the flaw. Let us now do this and see what happens.
Every proof begins with axioms. The students’ argument seems to deduce a contra-
diction from the teacher’s announcement, so it seems that the axioms in this case ought to
be some formalization of the announcement. Now, part of the announcement—the claim
that an examination will take place some time during the following week—is not difficult
to formalize, but the part that says that the examination will be a surprise is not as clear.
What is meant by “surprise”?
Whatever “surprise” means, it must at least mean that the students will not be able
to deduce logically the date of the examination ahead of time, for if the students could
prove that the date of the examination were such-and-such before the date arrived, they
would surely not be at all surprised by the exam. So a first step towards formalizing the
teacher’s announcement might be, “There will be an examination next week and its date
will not be deducible in advance.”
This is not sufficient, however, because every proof begins with axioms. To say that
the date of the examination will not be deducible in advance is a vague statement until
the axioms from which the date cannot be deduced are specified precisely. Now, it is
not completely clear which axioms are in question here; the informal word “surprise” is
too vague to give us many clues. However, if our formalization is to be at all true to the
original paradox, it should at least allow us to formalize the students’ argument to some
degree. Formalizing the teacher’s announcement as
(a) There will be an examination next week and its date will not be deducible in advance
from an empty set of assumptions
is certainly not satisfactory because it does not allow the students’ argument even to begin.
This would evade the paradox and not resolve it.
A better attempt at formalization might be something like
(b) There will be an examination next week and its date will not be deducible in advance
from the assumption that the examination will occur some time during the week.
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This formalization allows at least the first step of the students’ argument to be carried
out: given this announcement, the students can deduce that the examination will not
occur on the last day of the week. However, if we try to reproduce the next step of the
students’ argument—the step that eliminates the penultimate day of the week—we find
ourselves stuck. In order to eliminate the penultimate day, the students need to argue
that their ability to deduce, from statement (b), that the examination will not occur on
the last day implies that a last-day examination will not be surprising. But since we have
restricted “surprising” to mean “not deducible from the assumption that the examination
will occur sometime during the week” instead of “not deducible from statement (b),” the
students’ argument is blocked. To continue the argument we need to be able to use
the nondeducibility from the announcement as an assumption, i.e., we must embed the
nondeducibility from the announcement into the announcement itself.
It now becomes clear that to carry out the students’ argument, one needs a formal-
ization that is something like
(c) There will be an examination next week and its date will not be deducible in advance
using this announcement as an axiom.
In other words, the announcement must be formulated as a self-referential statement!
There is a temptation to end the analysis here with a comment that the self-referential
nature of statement (c) is the source of the paradox. After all, if a self-referential definition
like this were to be presented in a mathematical paper, we would surely reject it instantly
as illegal. Indeed, Shaw concludes his paper [25] with just such a comment.
However, we need to be careful. For it is possible in mathematics to formalize certain
kinds of self-referential statements. Indeed, this was one of the crucial ideas in Go¨del’s
proof of his incompleteness theorems, and it is now a standard technique in mathematical
logic. It is natural to ask if this technique can be used to obtain a completely formal
version of statement (c). The answer is yes; we give the construction (due to Fitch [11]; [4]
and [32] have similar constructions) in some detail since it is rather interesting.
Let us reduce the number of days to two for simplicity (we consider one-day weeks
shortly), and letQ1 andQ2 be statements representing the occurrence of the exam on days
one and two, respectively. Then what we are seeking is a statement S such that
S ≡ (Q1 & ([S⇒ Q1] is unprovable)) or else (Q2 & ([S & ∼Q1 ⇒ Q2] is unprovable)).
Given a first-order language that contains enough elementary arithmetic to handle prim-
itive recursive functions, together with some Go¨del numbering of the formulas, it is
straightforward to formalize most aspects of this statement. There are primitive recursive
functions “Neg,” “Conj,” and “Imp” encoding negation, conjunction, and implication (i.e.,
if q is the Go¨del number of Q then Neg q is the Go¨del number of the negation of Q, and
so on), and a primitive recursive relation R that relates i to j if and only if i is the Go¨del
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number of a proof of the sentence whose Go¨del number is j. The only tricky part is the
self-reference, and this is achieved using the usual (primitive recursive) “diagonalization”
operator D: D(m,n) is the Go¨del number of the sentence obtained by replacing the free
variable in the formula having Go¨del number m by the name of the number n.
Now let q1 and q2 be the Go¨del numbers of Q1 and Q2 respectively, let 6≡ denote
exclusive or, and let P[x] abbreviate ∃y:yRx. P stands for provable. Thenwe can formulate
the following formula with the free variable x:
(Q1 & ∼P[D(x,x) Imp q1]) 6≡ (Q2 & ∼P[(D(x,x) Conj Neg q1) Imp q2]).
Let h be the Go¨del number of this formula, and let S be the sentence obtained by
substituting h for x, i.e.,
(Q1 & ∼P[D(h,h) Imp q1]) 6≡ (Q2 & ∼P[(D(h,h) Conj Neg q1) Imp q2]). (†)
Then, by definition of D, D(h,h) is the Go¨del number of S. The clincher is that D(h,h) also
appears on the right-hand side of (†) exactly where we want it to appear. Using “#” to
denote “the name of the Go¨del number of” we can rewrite S as
(Q1 & ∼P[#(S⇒ Q1)]) 6≡ (Q2 & ∼P[#((S & ∼Q1)⇒ Q2)]).
This completes the formalization of statement (c). We can now imitate the students’
argument to show that S is logically false, i.e., that ∼S is a tautology. Using the definition
of S, we can prove
(S & ∼Q1)⇒ Q2. (1)
Let a be the Go¨del number of (1). By the nature of the relation R, the provability of (1)
implies P(a). But observe that ∼P(a) appears in the second disjunct in the definition of S.
It follows that
S⇒ Q1. (2)
The rest of the argument is now clear: if b is the Go¨del number of (2), then the provability
of (2) implies P(b), but ∼P(b) appears in the first disjunct of S. Therefore ∼S.
Thus, although self-reference is not illegitimate in all circumstances, it is illegitimate
here because this particular self-referential statement is self-contradictory. Fitch’s proof
has a satisfying air of definitiveness, and seems to vindicate Shaw.
However, various authors have raised objections to this analysis. Themost important
is that the proof does not give any explanation for why the teacher’s announcement
appears to be vindicated after the fact. It appears to pin the blame on the teacher’s
announcement instead of on the students, and surely this cannot be correct.
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A related objection rests on the observation that if the teacher had not announced
the exam to the class but had simply decided in secret to give a surprise exam, then
no paradox would have occurred. Therefore the trouble cannot be attributed solely to
the propositional content of the teacher’s announcement; the act of announcing it to the
students must play a crucial role. The purely logical analysis seems to ignore this.
These objections have convincedmany to reject entirely the “purely logical” approach,
and to propose a different, “epistemological” approach.
Before moving on to a discussion of the epistemological school, however, I want to
point out that the objections can bemet. For example, the first objection indicates a misun-
derstandingof thepurely logical approach. The conclusionof the logical analysis isnot that
the teacher’s announcement is self-contradictory and is the source of the paradox. Rather,
the conclusion is that in order for the students to carry out their argument that the teacher’s
announcement cannot be fulfilled, they must interpret the teacher’s announcement as
saying something like (c). If the teacher intended (c) when making the announcement,
then it would be contradictory, and would remain so after the examination. However, a
more reasonable assumption is that the teacher’s announcement, whatever it means, does
not mean (c), and that therefore the students misinterpret the announcement when they
make their argument. The announcement appears to be vindicated afterwards, but the
statement that is actually vindicated is something like “the students will be psychologically
surprised by the exam,” and such a statement does not permit the students’ argument to
be carried out. Similar observations are made in [4] and [9].
As for the objection about the role of the act of making the announcement, observe
that the same sequence of words can have different meanings depending on context,
and that in the case of the teacher’s announcement, the public utterance of the sentence
changes its propositional content from “there will be a surprise exam” to something like
“there will be a surprise exam in spite of the fact that I am now telling you that there will
be a surprise exam.” The logical analysis therefore does take into account the act ofmaking
the announcement, albeit implicitly, in its definition of the word “surprise.” Ignoring the
act of making the announcement would leave us stuck at (a).
3. The epistemological school
The purely logical approach is attractive to amathematician both because it shows exactly
what problems arise from trying to convert the paradoxical argument into a mathematical
proof and because it has connections to nontrivial theorems of logic. However, it has one
serious disadvantage: certain aspects of the paradox—the act of announcing the exam,
the belief or disbelief that the students have in the announcement, their assumption that
they will remember the announcement during the course of the week, and so on—are
taken into account only implicitly and not explicitly. It is therefore natural to ask if we
can formalize the paradox in a way that lays bare these “epistemic” aspects.
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Various epistemological formalizations have been proposed in the literature; we give
just one here (taken from [29]) to illustrate the idea. As before, reduce the number of days
to two for simplicity; let “1” denote “the exam occurs on the first day” and let “2” denote
“the exam occurs on the second day.” Let “Ka” denote “on the eve of the first day the
students will know” and let “Kb” denote “on the eve of the second day the students will
know.” The announcement can then be written
[1⇒∼Ka 1] & [2⇒ (∼Kb 2 & Kb ∼1)] & [1 ∨ 2]. (‡)
We now introduce certain assumptions about knowledge and add them to our list of rules
of inference in our logic.
KD: If one knows A& B, then one knows A and one knows B. Similarly, if one knows that
A implies B and one knows A, then one knows B.
KI: All logical truths are known.
KE: It is not possible to know something that is false.
We begin the argument with a lemma: Kb(‡)⇒∼2; remember that “⇒” here encom-
passes our new rules of logic KD, KI, and KE. Assume that Kb(‡) is true. By KD, it follows
that Kb[1 ∨ 2]. Now assume towards a contradiction that 2 is true, i.e., the exam is held
on the last day. From Kb(‡) and KE, (‡) follows, and 2 together with second conjunct of (‡)
implies ∼Kb 2 & Kb ∼1; in particular, ∼Kb 2. On the other hand, using KD, we deduce
from Kb[1 ∨ 2] and Kb ∼1 that Kb 2, a contradiction. Thus, Kb(‡) implies ∼2, and by KI
we can infer Ka[Kb(‡)⇒∼2].
Now we can proceed with the crux of the argument: deducing a contradiction from
the assumption KaKb(‡). Assume KaKb(‡). From KD and Ka[Kb(‡) ⇒ ∼2] it follows
that Ka ∼2. It is one of our logical truths (KE) that Kb(‡)⇒ (‡), so from KI we conclude
that Ka[Kb(‡)⇒ (‡)]. By KD and our assumption that KaKb(‡), this implies Ka(‡) and in
particular (by KD again) that Ka(1 ∨ 2). Since we know that Ka ∼2, it follows from KD
that Ka 1. But since Ka(‡) is true, (‡) is true (by KE), and in particular its first disjunct 1⇒
∼Ka 1 is true. Then from Ka 1 we deduce 1 (from KE) and hence ∼Ka 1, a contradiction.
This shows that certain plausible assumptions about knowledge—KI, KD, and KE,
togetherwith the assumption that the students know that theywill know the content of the
announcement throughout the week—are inconsistent. Pointing out to the students that
they are making these internally inconsistent assumptions about knowledge is enough
to dissolve the paradox; we do not necessarily have to decide which assumption is the
“wrong” one.
It is still interesting, however, to see if one of the assumptions appears to be a particu-
larly promising candidate for rejection. Perhaps the most popular candidate has been the
assumption that after hearing the announcement, the students “know” the content of the
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announcement. Those who maintain that we can never “know” things by authority or
that we can never “know” things about the future (at least not with the same certainty that
we can know many other things) naturally find this approach attractive. However, even
those who are less skeptical have reason to reject the assumption, because the statement
that the students are supposed to “know” is a statement that says something about the
students’ inability to “know” certain things. For comparison, consider the statement, “It
is raining but John Doe does not know that it is raining.” Clearly, John Doe cannot know
the content of this statement even if the statement is true and it is uttered in his hearing
by an extraordinarily reliable source. This curious phenomenon is known as a “Moore
paradox” or a “blindspot,” and the surprise exam paradox may be viewed as simply a
more intricate version of this situation. The easiest way to see the connection is to reduce
the length of the week to one day, so that the announcement becomes, “There will be an
exam tomorrow but you do not know that.” This approach is essentially the one offered
in [3], [6], [18], [21], [22], [24], and [29].
Others have argued that the assumption KaKb(‡) is plausible only if one invokes the
“temporal retention principle” (the students know that they will not forget the announce-
ment during the week) or “Hintikka’s KK principle” (if one knows something then one
knows that one knows it), and that one or both of these assumptions should be discarded.
I do not discuss this in detail here since I feel it is of limited mathematical interest, but I
mention a brilliant variation of the paradox concocted by Sorensen [28], which suggests
that rejecting these assumptions may be missing the point.
Exactly one of five students, Art, Bob, Carl, Don, and Eric, is to be given an exam.
The teacher lines them up alphabetically so that each student can see the backs of the
students ahead of him in alphabetical order but not the students after him. The students
are shown four silver stars and one gold star. Then one star is secretly put on the back
of each student. The teacher announces that the gold star is on the back of the student
who must take the exam, and that that student will be surprised in the sense that he will
not know he has been designated until they break formation. The students argue that
this is impossible; Eric cannot be designated because if he were he would see four silver
stars and would know that he was designated. The rest of the argument proceeds in the
familiar way. The significance of this variation is that in our preceding formalization we
can let Ka mean “Art knows” and Kb mean “Bob knows” and then KaKb(‡) appears to be
immediately plausible without reference to time or the KK principle. Thus, the problem
remains even if those principles are rejected; see [28] and [16] for more discussion.
A very interesting variant of the epistemological approach, that of Kaplan and Mon-
tague [15], is a kind of hybrid of the logical and epistemological schools. They prove a
theorem called “the Paradox of the Knower” that is reminiscent of Tarski’s theorem on
the indefinability of the truth predicate. Suppose we we have a first-order language and
we wish to introduce a knowledge predicate K. There are certain reasonable-sounding
conditions that we might want to place on K:
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(A) K(#Q)⇒ Q;
(B) (A) is known, i.e., K(#A);
(C) if Q can be proved from P and K(#P), then K(#Q).
Unfortunately, these assumptions cannot be satisfied. Using a diagonalization argument,
we can construct a sentence S such that S ≡ K(#(∼S)), and then derive a contradiction
by substituting this S for Q and A for P in (A), (B), and (C). Thus, no such knowledge
predicate is possible.
One might think at first that (C) is the dubious assumption since certainly nobody
knows all the logical consequences of what he knows, but (C) can be weakened to the
assumption that the logical conclusion of a particular explicitly given proof is known,
so the theorem is quite a strong one. The Paradox of the Knower has inspired some
sophisticated work in logic; see [1], [2], or [13].
4. Game theory
Someauthorshavemade the fascinating suggestion that the surprise examparadoxmaybe
related to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma is a two-player game
in which each player has the choice of either defecting or cooperating and must make
the choice without communicating with the other player and without prior knowledge of
the other player’s choice. If one player defects and the other player cooperates, then the
defector enjoys a large payoff and the cooperator suffers a large loss. If both players defect
then both payoffs are zero, and if both players cooperate then they both earn a moderate
payoff. It is easy to show that each player has a dominant strategy (i.e., one that is better
than any other strategy regardless of the opponent’s strategy): to defect.
Intuitively, defection is the best choice because the prisoner’s dilemma is a “one-shot”
game; there is no incentive for players to build up a cooperative relationship since they
are guaranteed never to meet again. This suggests considering the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma, in which there are n rounds instead of just one (and the fact that there are
exactly n rounds is public knowledge). The payoffs in each round are as in the usual
prisoner’s dilemma, and the two players are still not allowed to communicate with each
other, but at each round they do know and remember the results of all previous rounds.
One might think that in this case, occasional cooperation would be superior to invariable
defection—the idea being that a cooperative move in an early stage, even if the opponent
defects, encourages future cooperation that counterbalances earlier losses.
Consider the following “surprise examination” argument that even in the n-round
prisoner’s dilemma, the optimal strategy is invariable defection. The last round of an
iterated prisoner’s dilemma is identical to the “one-shot” prisoner’s dilemma, since there
is no hope of future cooperation. Hence the optimal last-round strategy is to defect. But
since defection in the last round is certain, there is no incentive in the penultimate round to
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cooperate, for doing so cannot possibly encourage future cooperation. Thus, the optimal
strategy in the penultimate round is also defection. Proceeding by induction, we conclude
that perfect players always defect.
The analogy between this argument and the standard surprise examination argument
is quite striking at first. Indeed, Sorensen [30] has argued that the two are really the
same, and has substantially revised his analysis of the surprise exam as a result. There
is, however, an important disanalogy. In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, the conclusion
about invariable defection is counterintuitive, but it does not lead to an explicit contradiction.
It is not difficult to adapt our argument to give a fully rigorous mathematical proof that
in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, a Nash equilibrium is possible only if both players
defect in every round; see [12, p. 166]. (A Nash equilibrium is a situation in which if the
strategies of all but one player are held fixed, that player cannot do better by changing
strategies. One reason that the “surprise exam” argument we presented is not rigorous
as it stands is that the word “optimal” is imprecise. A Nash equilibrium is a precise
concept that captures some—though not all—of the connotations of the word “optimal.”)
Therefore, I believe that the iterated prisoner’s dilemma is essentially distinct from the
surprise examination paradox and is not just a variant; see [23].
Nevertheless, one might be able to exploit the parallel between the surprise examina-
tion and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma to obtain some new ideas for game theory. After
all, cooperation is observed in the real world, and this suggests that the usual mathemat-
ical model of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma might ignore some crucial point. For some
interesting ideas in this direction, see [17].
Finally, I want to mention an unpublished idea of Karl Narveson that illustrates how
the surprise exam paradox can inspire new mathematics. A teacher gives a quiz every
week, with probability p1 on Monday, p2 on Tuesday, and so on. The teacher’s goal is to
find a probability distribution that maximizes the absolute value of the expected surprise
when the quiz is announced. Here “surprise” is based on Shannon entropy, so the surprise
on Monday is log p1, the surprise on Tuesday is the log of the probability that the exam
occurs on Tuesday given that it has not occurred onMonday, and so on until Friday, when
the quiz becomes a certainty and its announcement no longer comes as a surprise.
Let qn,m be the probability that the exam occurs on the nth-to-the-last day of anm-day
week given that it has not occurred on any previous days, where n ranges from zero to m
− 1. As one can easily show, the optimal value of qn,m is independent of m, so we drop
the second subscript.
Now set s0 = 0. Narveson has shown that qn is given by the mutual recursions
qn = exp(sn−1 − 1)
sn = sn−1 − qn
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The p’s may then be recovered from the q’s. For a five-day week, the probabilities for each
of the five days are about 0.1620, 0.1654, 0.1713, 0.1844, and 0.3169.
5. Further reading
The literature contains a wide variety of other approaches to the surprise examination
paradox. Cargile [5] is the first paper in the literature to mention game theory. Clark [7]
remarks that strictly mathematical analyses of the surprise exam are rare in the literature
and he tries to fill this gap. Smullyan [27] weaves Go¨del’s theorem, brainteasers, the
surprise exam, and other “epistemic” and “doxastic” paradoxes into a delightful tapestry.
Some have seen connections between the surprise exam and the sorites paradox (“remov-
ing one grain of sand from a heap of sand leaves it a heap so zero grains of sand is still
a heap”); see [8], [26], and [31]. A connection with the paradox of Schro¨dinger’s cat is
discussed in [14] and [19].
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The Surprise Examination or Unexpected Hanging Paradox:
An Exhaustive Bibliography
Timothy Y. Chow
tchowATalumDOTmitDOTedu
When writing [Cho], I tried very hard to compile an exhaustive bibliography for
the surprise exam paradox. I believe I came very close to succeeding, but the MONTHLY
refused to publish it, saying that extensive bibliographies are not appropriate forMONTHLY
articles. I am therefore making the bibliography freely available on the web instead. I
will try to update this bibliography continually; if you know of any references that are not
listed here, please let me know!
The list below was last updated June 25, 2011. (The last previous ArXiv update
was made on September 6, 2005.) Minor updates have been made to some entries: [Clk],
[Cra], [Frn], [Jac], [K-M], [Kea], [Loe], [Sob]. As one might expect, Google Scholar proved
to be an invaluable tool for discovering new references, including some such as [Lan],
[Ge1], [Pri], [Kaw], and [Chn] that I hadpreviously overlookeddespite publicationdates of
1986, 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2002 respectively. At the same time, Google Scholar generated
many hits that I was not sure I wanted to include. Some people had written substantial
articles or given talks on the paradox but had not (yet) formally published them; in the
end, I decided to exclude unpublished items from this bibliography (though I did allow
for dissertations such as [Mar] and electronic publications such as [So13]). Other papers
were primarily concerned with some other topic and made only passing reference to the
paradox, or used the paradox just as an illustrative example of something. These papers I
evaluated on a case-by-case basis andmade a personal judgment call; I decided to include
[Ald], [Cuo], [Da1], [Da2], [Fas], [Gin], [Gra], [H-H], [Kl1], [Kl2], [L-K], and [WHR], but
omitted a number of others. Specifically, I decided that the Kaplan–Montague paradox
of the knower was distinct from the surprise examination paradox, and I even went back
and deleted some entries that I had included in previous versions of my bibliography that
were concerned only with the paradox of the knower.
Following my previous practice, I included books that contained a substantial
discussion of the paradox even if most of the book was devoted to other topics; in this
category were [Cv2], [Cv3], [Kim], [So12], and [T-H]. And of course, I documented a
steady stream of new publications on the paradox: [Cv1], [DK1], [DK2], [F-B], [Ge2],
[G-C], [Hu], [Hua], [Kna], [K-R], [Lvy], [ØGS], [Prr], [Sav], [S-W], [Va´z], [Wm1], [Wm2],
and [Zha]. Of these, [Prr] (see also the accompanying commentary in [ØGS]) is one of the
most interesting because it is a previously unpublished manuscript that probably dates
from the early 1950’s.
Finally, in addition to the acknowledgments that I made in previous versions of
this bibliography, I would like to thank Sandy Lemberg andArthur Benjamin for notifying
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me about some of the new references above, and Hans van Ditmarsch, Paul Franceschi,
Lasse Burri Gram-Hansen, Ran Raz, and John Williams for keeping me informed about
their own research on the paradox.
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